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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1:
as

to

whether

or

Is there a genuine issue as to any material fact
not

there

is

an

easement

in

favor

of

the

defendant, Chadaz, over the property owned by the plaintiffs?
A.

Standard of Review:

The conclusions of the trial court

are reviewed for correctness, and no deference is given to the
trial court's conclusions.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah

1989); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991)
and Niederhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P. 2d 1193
(Utah App. 192).

When reviewing a summary judgment, the party

against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all
the

facts

presented,

and

all

the

inferences

fairly

therefrom, considered in a light not favorable to him.
Farnsworth Motel. 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953).
Corp. , 813 P. 2d 104

arising

Morris v.

Wineger v. Froerer

(Utah 1991) and Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev.

Corp.. 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992).

Therefore, the appellate

court applies the same standard as the trial court and affirms the
summary judgment only if there is no dispute as to any material
fact.

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) and Themy v.

Seagull Enters., Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979).
B.

Preservation

of

Issue

for

Appeal:

This

issue

was

preserved for appeal by the "Verified Objections Of Defendant, Reta
Chadaz, To Memorandum

Of Points And Authorities
1

In Support Of

Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 81-115);
"Verified Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 116-118);
"Verified Memorandum of Points And Authorities In Support Of
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 119-149);
"Supplemental Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Reply To Plaintiffs'
Supplemental Argument" (See R. at pp. 250-288); and "Transcript Of
Summary Judgment Hearing"

(See R. at p. 350).

ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court commit error in applying the
law so as to determine there is no easement in favor of the
defendant Chadaz over the property owned by the plaintiffs?
A.

Standard of Review; The trial court's legal conclusions

are reviewed for correctness, and no deference is given to the
trial court.

This court is free to reappraise the trial court's

legal conclusions.

Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am. Inc. , 814 P.2d 1108

(Utah 1991); Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App.
1988); and Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
B.

Preservation

of Issue

for Appeal:

This

issue was

preserved for appeal by the "Verified Objections Of Defendant, Reta
Chadaz, To Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 81-115);
"Verified Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 116-118) ;
"Verified Memorandum of Points And Authorities In Support Of
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment" (See R. at pp. 119-149) ;
"Supplemental Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Reply To Plaintiffs'
2

Supplemental Argument" (See R. at pp. 250-288) ; and "Transcript Of
Summary Judgment Hearing"
ISSUE NO. 3:

(See R. at pp. 350).

Should the trial court have amended or made

additional findings in accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure when granting plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment?
A.

Standard of Review:

While the trial court's failure to

adequately identify the grounds for its decision is not necessarily
reversible

error,

" . . .

the

presumption

of

correctness

ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has little operative effect
when members of

[the appellate] court cannot divine the trial

court's reasoning because of the cryptic nature of its ruling."
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992); Allen
v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins.. 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992).
B.

Preservation of Issue for Appeal:

This issue was preserved for appeal by the "Verified Motion
for Amendment to Memorandum Decision" (See R. at pp. 298-300 and
315-317); and "Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendant's Motion for Amendment to Memorandum Decision"
(See R. at pp. 301-307 and 318-324).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-3-2(1).
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in
the manner prescribed by this title, each original
document or certified copy of a document complying with
Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy
of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1-04,
and each financing statement complying with Section 70A9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time
of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart
3

notice to all persons of their contents.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The mot i on,
memorandum and affidavits shall be filed and served
in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)
Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Findings of a
master to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open court following
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum decision filed by the court. The trial court
need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs seek to have the court declare that they own
certain real property free and clear of any easement claimed by
4

Reta Chadaz.

Reta Chadaz seeks to have the court declare that she

owns a 66 foot wide right of way across the real property owned by
the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' received ownership of the property in

question by Warranty Deed dated July 23, 1993 and recorded on July
29, 1993. Reta Chadaz's ownership of the 66 foot wide right of way
is based upon a Special Warranty Deed dated October 24, 1980 and
recorded on December 9, 1980.

The reservation of the right of way

in said Special Warranty Deed was to fulfill a contract obligation
between the grantor of said Special Warranty Deed and Reta Chadaz.
Plaintiffs filed this action to quiet title in the disputed
property (See R. at pp. 2-16) and Reta Chadaz filed a Counterclaim
to quiet her title in the right of way (See R. at pp. 17-28) . Both
parties moved for summary judgment (See R. at pp. 52-54 and 116118) and the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision which granted
plaintiffs' motion and denied Reta Chadaz's motion.
295-297 and Addendum

E) .

(See R. at pp.

Reta Chadaz then moved to have the

Memorandum Decision amended, so as to clarify the grounds for the
court's ruling (See R. at pp. 298-307 and 315-326), and a second
Memorandum Decision was issued by the court (See R. at pp. 327-331
and Addendum F) . A Notice of Appeal was then filed by Reta Chadaz
(see R. at pp. 335-340) wherein she sought review of the trial
court's grant of Summary Judgment to plaintiffs.
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for
review:
1.

Floyd and Reta Chadaz, sellers, owned approximately 47.12

acres which

they

sold

on contract
5

to Heritage

Park

Partners,

buyers, by contract dated May 12, 1980, (See R. at pp. 124-136 and
Addendum A ) .
2.

In keeping with this contract this entire property was

placed in trust with Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency by
Warranty Deed dated and filed May 12, 1980 at 4:10 p.m.

(See R. at

p. 137).
3.

On the same day (May 12, 1980) a Warranty Deed was made

by Hillam to buyers (Heritage Park Partners) covering all of the
property owned by Chadaz fronting on Main Street in Tremonton,
Utah. This deed was recorded May 12, 1980 at 4:12 p.m. The parcel
includes the 1.58 acres property in dispute.

(See R. at p. 138).

I
4.

The

buyers

(Heritage

defaulted on said agreement.

Park

Partners)

subsequently

After negotiations, a Supplemental

Agreement dated November 25, 1980, was entered into to assist the
buyers (Heritage Park Partners) in being able to continue in the
purchase of the property.
5.

(See R. at pp. 139-145 and Addendum B ) .

As one of the conditions of the Supplemental Agreement

the buyers (Heritage Park Partners) agreed:
"that when the property fronting on Main Street, which
has been released by the seller to the buyer, has been
sold by the buyer to a third party that there will be a
reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main Street to
the seller's remaining property."
(See R. at 141 and Addendum B ) .
6.

After entering into the Supplemental Agreement the buyers

(Heritage Park Partners) began doing business as Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc.

This was a corporation owned by all of the same

individuals who were the partners in Heritage Park Partners.
6

(See

R. at p. 266 paragraph 6; R. at pp. 270-272).
7.

As

corporation,

a result
a

of the

Warranty

Deed

change
from

from

a partnership

Heritage

Park

to a

Partners

to

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., was recorded December 9, 1980 at 3:05
p.m., covering the 1.58 acres previously conveyed by Chadaz to
Heritage Park Partners.
8.

(See R. at p. 261-262 and Addendum C ) .

In accordance with the Supplemental Agreement, when the

buyers (Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners)
sold the property in question, 1.58 acres, to Villatek Inc., the
Special

Warranty

Deed

to

Villatek

contained

the

following

provisions:
"Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66 Feet Of Said
Property, For The Purpose Of A Proposed Road."
This Special Warranty Deed was recorded December 9, 1980, at 3:10
p.m.

This was after the Supplemental Agreement had been entered

into. This Special Warranty Deed has remained of record since that
date.

(See R. at pp. 263-264 and Addendum D ) .
9.

Despite the Supplemental Agreement the buyers (Heritage

Park Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners) again defaulted
and all of the property, with the exception of the 1.58 acres of
property sold to Villatek, was returned to Chadaz.

(See R. at p.

85, par. 11).
10.

Some time

later, by Quit Claim Deed dated May 2,

1996,

recorded October 8, 1996, Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. conveyed to
Reta Chadaz all of the rights it had previously reserved in said
right of way.

(See R. at pp. 148-149).

7

11.

Reta Chadaz presently owns both the right of way and

approximately 35 acres to the south of said right of way which
abuts to said right of way.

(See R. at p. 21, par. 9 and p. 22

par. 11).
12.

At the time the plaintiffs received actual notice of the

claimed easement the only impovements that had been made on the
disputed easement was "a fence had been removed and some gravel had
been placed on said property".

(See R. at p. 100 par. 4 ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court ruling was based upon the pleadings, memoranda of
authorities in support of motions for summary judgments submitted
by both parties and arguments of counsel.
presented.

No other evidence was

On a review of a summary judgment the party against

whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the
facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom,
considered in a light most favorable to him.
Defendant's position is that there is a genuine issue as to a
material

fact

plaintiffs.

concerning

each

of the

points

raised

by

the

Briefly these points of the plaintiffs and the

responses of the defendant are as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' Point - plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers
without notice.
Defendant's Response - the reservation of the disputed
easement was made by a Special Warranty Deed recorded
December 9, 1980, and has remained of record since that
date.

The plaintiffs acquired their title by Warranty
8

Deed recorded July 29, 1993. The plaintiffs are charged
with constructive notice of said easement.
Plaintiffs7 Point - dominant and servient parcels were
separated and no longer abut each other.
Defendant's Response - this defendant still owns the
property (approximately 35 acres) abutting the south end
of the disputed right of way.

The reservation of the

right of way was for the express purpose of providing
access from Main Street to the approximately 35 acres.
Defendant contends that she owns the right of way and the
acreage to which it leads and these two parcels do abut
to each other.
Plaintiffs7 Point - there was no consideration to support
the express grant of the easement.
Defendant7s Response - the consideration for the easement
was the fact that the Buyers of the property were in
default and the Sellers (defendant herein) granted the
Buyers additional time to make payments and as part of
the consideration for this, the Buyers agreed to the
reservation of the easement

(over the land that had

already been deeded by the Sellers to the Buyers) . This
access was very

important to the defendant.

This

remained true whether the Buyers built the road or
whether upon repossession the defendant built the road.
Plaintiffs7 Point - the defendant had abandoned the
easement.
9

Defendant's Response - this was an express recorded right
of way, not a right of way by prescription. An easement
acquired by grant or reservation cannot be lost by mere
nonuse for any length of time, no matter how great.
There was no intent of the defendant to abandon the
easement.
Plaintiffs' Point - defendant is barred by equitable
estoppel from claiming an easement.
Defendant' s

Response

-

there

have

been

no

false

representations or concealment of natural facts by the
defendant. The plaintiffs had constructive notice of the
easement and certainly had a means of knowledge of the
true facts.

Both of these facts make the equitable

estoppel doctrine inapplicable.
Plaintiffs' Point -

this was an easement in gross and

could not be transferred to subsequent owners.
Defendant's Response - this was an easement for a road to
serve as access to a subdivision. It was to specifically
benefit a parcel of land.

It was not a personal right

(i.e. access to an individual for hunting or fishing).
It was, therefore, not an easement in gross.
Plaintiffs' Point - the easement was no longer needed.
Defendant's Response - this is a recorded easement.

It

is needed as much today as it was when it was recorded.
It gives direct access to Main Street in Tremonton, Utah.
There

is no such direct access to the defendant's
10

remaining property without this easement.
8.

Plaintiffs' Point - a grantor cannot reserve an easement
to a third party in a deed.
Defendant's Response - this case does not involve a third
party (stranger to the deed or third party beneficiary).
Heritage Park Partners, the original buyer, changed their
form

of

doing

business

from

a

partnership

corporation known as Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.

to

a

The new

corporation continued to carry out the obligations of the
old partnership.

The Supplemental Agreement, the deed

from the partnership to the corporation and the deed from
the corporation to Villatek (in which the reservation of
the right of way was made) and the quit claim deed from
the

corporation

to

the

defendant

all

support

the

defendant's position.
9.

Plaintiffs' Point - the trial court's first Memorandum
Decision which stated "For the reasons stated in the
Plaintiffs' Motion

for Summary Judgment

the

same

is

granted" is proper and need not be amended.
Defendant's Response - as set forth in Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the trial court is required
to issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its
decision on all motions granted under Rule 56 when the
motion is based upon more than one ground.

Clearly in

this case the motion was based upon a number of grounds.

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT
THERE IS AN EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT CHADAZ
OVER THE PROPERTY OWNED BY PLAINTIFFS
There are several disputed and material facts which, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Reta Chadaz indicate there is
a genuine dispute as to whether or not she has an easement over
plaintiffs' property. These disputed facts are set forth below and
clearly establish that summary judgment is not proper.
A.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not Plaintiffs
Are Bona Fide Purchasers Without Notice.

The plaintiffs argue that they were "without notice of the
easement" (See plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiffs7 Motion For Summary Judgment R. at pp. 5859).

This is contrary to the Special Warranty Deed which created

the easement and which was recorded December 9, 1980, long before
plaintiffs obtained the property.

(See Special Warranty Deed

attached to Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim as Exhibit "A" R.
at pp. 25-26 and Addendum D).
Section 57-3-2(1) of the Utah Code provides in relevant part,
that once a document is properly recorded it "shall from the time
of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to
all persons of their [its] contents." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 57-3-2(1) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, since the Special Warranty Deed has remained of record
since

December

9,

1980,

the

plaintiffs

are

constructive notice of the contents of said deed.

charged

with

In addition to

the constructive notice, plaintiffs were put on actual notice of
this

defendant's

interest

in

the

property

prior

to

any

improvements, except removal of fence and placing of gravel and
grass on the property.

(See Affidavit of Maurice Staples R. at pp.

99-103).
B.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The
Dominant And Servient Parcels No Longer 2\but Each Other.

The defendant, Reta Chadaz, still owns the same property which
the right-of-way was established to benefit and this property abuts
to the right-of-way.
The chain of title to the Chadaz property that was involved in
the original sale is as follows:
1.

Floyd

Chadaz

and Reta

Chadaz

conveyed

by

Warranty

Deed to Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., a
Utah Corporation, Trustee, pursuant to a Trust Agreement
dated the 12th day of May, 1980 (recorded in Book 331,
Page 977, 5/12/80).

This deed conveyed 47.12 acres.

(See R. at p. 137).
2.

Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., conveyed
by Warranty Deed to Heritage Park Partners (recorded in
Book 331, Page 978, 5/12/80).

This covers approximately

1.58 acres being all of the Chadaz property located on
Main Street.

(See R. at p. 138).

13

3.

Heritage

Park Partners

conveyed

by Warranty

Deed

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., a Utah Corporation

to

(dated

10/24/80, recorded 12/9/80 at 3:05 p.m. in Book 339, Page
678 as Instrument No. 82457H).

This covered 1.58 acres.

(See R. at pp. 261-262 and Addendum C ) .
4.

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., a Utah Corporation conveyed by
Special

Warranty

Deed

to

Villatek

Inc.,

a

Utah

Corporation (dated 10/24/80 recorded 12/9/80 at 3:10 p.m.
in Book 339, Page 680 as Instrument No. 82458H).
covered

the

1.58

acres

and

contained

the

This

provision

"Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66 Feet Of Said
Property, For the Purpose Of A Proposed Road".
added).

(Emphasis

This is where the right-of-way in question is

first recorded.

(See R. at pp. 146-147 and Addendum D) .

It is important to note the date, recording date, time of
recording, book, page and instrument number of paragraphs
3 and 4 above.

Both of these deeds are dated 10/24/80.

The deed from Heritage Park Partners to Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc. was recorded 12/9/80 at 3:05 p.m. in Book
339, Page 678 as Instrument No. 82457H.

The deed from

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. to Villatek, Inc. was recorded
12/19/80 at 3:10 p.m. in Book 339, Page 680 as Instrument
No. 82458H.

The second deed being recorded immediately

after the first.
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5.

Villatek, Inc. conveyed by Warranty Deed to Bradley J.
Jorgensen (recorded in Book 355, Page 217 dated 2/25/82
recorded 2/26/82). There was no mention of the Right-ofWav in the conveyance.

(Emphasis added).

There is no

further mention of the right-of-way on the county records
until the Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
to Reta Chadaz (dated 05/02/96 was recorded 10/03/96 in
Book 633, Page 1112; see R. at pp. 104-105).

This covers

the right-of-way only.
6.

Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., Trustee,
conveyed

by

Special

Warranty

Deed

to

Floyd

Chadaz

(recorded in Book 349, Page 596 dated September 1, 1981
recorded September 3, 1981).

This covers all of the

property that had not been conveyed to Heritage Park
Plaza,

Inc.

by

Hillams

as

Trustee.

This

included

approximately 35 acres adjacent to the south end of the
right-of-way that is in dispute in this lawsuit.
The

right

of

way

does

abut

the

property

owned

by

the

defendant-appellant, Reta Chadaz, and is the only direct access
from her prime development property to Main Street.
C.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not Any
Consideration Supported The Express Grant Of Easement.

The plaintiffs contend there was no consideration given by
this defendant to the purchasers for the granting of this easement.
An agreement dated May 12, 1980 (See R. at pp. 124-136 and
Addendum A) was entered into between Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz
as Sellers and Heritage Park Partners as the Buyers.
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This was for

the purchase of 47.12 acres of land, including the property in
dispute in this case.

The Buyers were unable to meet their

obligations under this original agreement and were at risk of
losing all of their rights under the contract. All of the Sellers'
land which fronted on Main Street had already been deeded to the
Buyers.
As

part

of

the

consideration

for

granting

the

Buyers

additional time to perform on their contract, the Sellers entered
into a Supplemental Agreement dated November 25, 1980 (See R. at
pp. 139-145 and Addendum B) . Part of the consideration being given
by the Buyers to the Sellers was to be a reservation of a 66 foot
wide roadway (see paragraph 4 of said agreement) which was stated
as follows:
"The buyer agrees that when the property fronting on
Main Street, which has been released by the seller to the
buyer, has been sold by the buyer to a third party there
will be a reservation 7of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main
Street to the sellers remaining property . . . "
(See Addendum B ) .
It is defendant's position that there was consideration given
by both parties for the Supplemental Agreement.

The sellers

extended the time for payments and the buyers agreed to the
reservation of the easement.
D.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The
Defendant Chadaz Abandoned The Easement

The easement in this case was created by the reservation of
the right-of-way for a road set forth in the Special Warranty Deed
(See R. at pp. 263-264 and Addendum D) .
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This is not an easement

obtained by use or prescription.

Since

a

reservation

is

the

creation in behalf of the grantor of a new right issuing out of the
thing granted, an easement appurtenant to the grantors 7 remaining
land may be created by reservation.

A reservation of an easement

is equivalent, for the purpose of creation of the easement, to an
express grant of the easement by the grantee of the lands

(25

Am.Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses Section 19).
In Utah an easement or right of way may not be lost by non-use
alone if it is gained by conveyance.

Western Gateway Storage Co.

v. Treseder. 567 P2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977).

An actual intent to

abandon the easement must be evident and this must be proved by
clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership and right of
use.

Id.

"...

[N]onuse will not extinguish an easement created

by express grant, no matter how long the easement has gone unused."
(25 Am.Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses, Section 114)
As previously set forth, the easement has remained of record
since it was recorded on December 9, 1980.

The only evidence

before the court is non-use of the easement by Chadaz.

This is

clearly not sufficient to show an abandonment of the easement.
E.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether or Not Defendant
Chadaz Is Barred By Equitable Estoppel From Claiming An
Easement.

Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies depends
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. There can
be no equitable

estoppel

if any essential

lacking or not satisfactorily proved.
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element thereof

is

The elements of equitable estoppel as related to the party to
the estoppel, are:
1.

conduct which amounts to a false representation

or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with those which the
party subsequently attempts to assert;
2.

the intention, or at least the expectation,

that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influences
the other party or other persons; and
3.

knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real

facts.
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §35, (emphasis added).
The elements of equitable estoppel as related to the party
claiming the estoppel, are:
1.

lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge

of the truth as to the facts in question;
2.

reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or

statements of the party to be estopped;
3.

action

or

inaction based

thereon

of such

character as to change the position and status of the
party claiming the estoppel to his injury, detriment, or
prejudice.
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §35, (emphasis added).
The elements of equitable estoppel are not present in our
case.

There was never any representation by Reta Chadaz, that
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there was no easement (See Answer of defendant to Plaintiffs'
Complaint, paragraph 8, R. at p. 19). The property, consisting of
the easement, was apparently purchased by the plaintiffs on July
23, 1998.

(See R. at p. 7). Shortly thereafter plaintiff, Dean

Potter, had been advised of the easement and had been furnished a
copy of an Agreement relating to the easement (See R. at pp. 99103).

This was done prior to any improvements upon said property

except the removal of a fence and placing of some gravel upon said
property (See R. at p. 100 paragraph 4).
Again, plaintiffs had constructive notice of the easement, the
recorded Special Warranty Deed (See R. at pp. 263-264 and Addendum
D) and actual notice prior to construction on said easement (See R.
at pp. 99-103) .
true facts.

They certainly had a means of knowledge of the

As to whether plaintiffs acted in good faith is

certainly a fact question to be decided by the court or jury and
not proper for a Summary Judgment.
F.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The
Easement Was An Easement In Gross And Could Not Be
Transferred To Subsequent owners.

The easement in this case is an appurtenant easement.

An

appurtenant easement is one whose benefits serve a parcel of land;
more exactly it serves the owner of that land in a way that cannot
be separated from his rights in the land.

Abbott v. Nampa School

District No. 181, 119 Idaho 544, 808 P. 2d 1289

(Idaho 1991)

(emphasis added).
The easement in this case is not an easement in gross.

An

easement in gross is mere personal interest in or right to the use
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of the land of another.

It is attached to, and vested in, the

person to whom it is granted.

(25 Am.Jur. 2d Easements and

Licenses §11 (emphasis added)).
Whether an easement in a given case is appurtenant or in gross
depends mainly on the nature of the right and the intention of the
parties.

(25 Am.Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §12). Easements in

gross are not favored by the courts, however, and an easement will
never be presumed personal when it may fairly be construed as
appurtenant to some other estate.

Thus, if an easement is in its

nature an appropriate and useful adjunct of the land conveyed
having in view the intention of the parties as to its use, and
there is nothing to show that the parties intended it to be a mere
personal right, it should be held to be an easement appurtenant and
not an easement in gross.

If doubt exists as to its real nature,

an easement is presumed to be appurtenant and not in gross.

(25

Am.Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §12).
The facts in our case are that a right of way was reserved for
"a right-of-way over the east 66 feet of said property, for the
purpose of a proposed road"

(See R. at p. 264). There was nothing

personal about the right of way; it was and still is appurtenant to
the dominant tenement and necessary for direct access from Main
Street to the prime development property of the defendant, Reta
Chadaz.
G.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether Or Not The
Easement Was No Longer Needed.

The easement as provided for in the Supplemental Agreement
(See R. at pp. 106-111 and Addendum B) and as reserved in the
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Special Warranty Deed (See R. at pp. 97-98 and Addendum D) gave to
the owner of the property to the south (approximately 35 acres)
direct access to Main Street.

This greatly enhanced the value of

the property to the South. This was true whether the buyers of the
property developed it and paid it off or whether the property was
returned to the sellers (Chadaz) by default.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Tremonton City
would approve the subdivision without the easement in question.
The fact that the roadway was not completed with curb, gutter,
sidewalks, sewer and pavement prior to October 1, 1981, certainly
did not eliminate the need for the roadway.

Just because part of

the consideration may have failed does not mean that the balance of
the consideration (the right of way itself) should fail.
The purpose of the Supplemental Agreement (See R. at p. 107
paragraph 4 and Addendum B) was to correct an oversight that had
been made by Chadaz, that is, failure to reserve a right of way.
The agreement was made with the then owner of the property over
which the right of way was to pass. The then owner had every right
to reserve a right of way for a road and that right of way could be
used by any developer of the property for the purpose of developing
the property.
This easement was needed then and it is still needed now.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLYING
THE LAW SO AS TO DETERMINE THERE IS NO EASEMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT CHADAZ OVER THE
PROPERTY OWNED BY THE PLAINTIFFS.
The plaintiffs' use of several different legal theories in
support of their motion for summary judgment, together with the two
separate and somewhat confusing Memorandum Decisions issued by the
trial court, make it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the
reasoning behind the trial court's grant of summary judgment.1
However, since none of the legal theories relied upon by the
plaintiff justify a summary judgment, the trial court erred in its
interpretation of the law. Set forth below are the reasons summary
judgment was improper.
A.

The Easement Reserved By Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
(Previously Heritage Park Partners) Was In Fulfillment Of
A Contractual Obligation To Chadaz And Created A Valid
Easement In Favor Of Chadaz.

Plaintiffs have argued that since Chadaz conveyed the 1.58
acres to Heritage Park Partners without reserving an easement, such
an easement could not be subsequently created in favor of
Chadaz. This argument is based upon the so called "stranger to the
deed" legal theory and assumes that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was
an unrelated third party which had no contractual obligations or

1

Neither decision relies upon any specific legal authority
(other than a reference that plaintiffs7 reliance on the Wade case
"is not entirely justified" (see R. at p. 296)).
The first
decision seems to adopt plaintiffs7"shotgun" approach by summarily
referring to the "reasons stated in the plaintiffs7 Motion for
Summary Judgment" (See R. at p. 296 and Addendum E) and the second
decision briefly mentions almost every theory relied upon by
plaintiffs (S£e R. at pp. 327-331 and Addendum F ) .
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connections to Chadaz.
As previously set forth, Heritage Park Partners entered into
an agreement with Chadaz to purchase property owned by Chadaz.
After a default had occurred and before the sale was completed, a
supplemental agreement was entered into between Heritage Park
Partners and Chadaz wherein Heritage Park Partners specifically
agreed to create an easement across the 1.58 acres in favor of
Chadaz.

Before this easement was created, Heritage Park Partners

became Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was not
an unrelated third party, but rather the successor to Heritage Park
Partners.
It was the intention of both Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and
Heritage Park Partners to fulfill the obligation to Chadaz in
accordance with the Supplemental Agreement.

That obligation was,

in fact, fulfilled when Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. reserved the 66
foot right of way in the Special Warranty Deed (See Addendum F).
This is evidenced by the following facts which were submitted
to the trial court:
1.

The Affidavit of James C. Kaiserman (See R. at

pp. 270-272) clearly explains that:

"The owners of

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. were the same as the partners
of Heritage Park Partners11 (See R. at p. 271 paragraph 4)
(emphasis added).

The Affidavit states:

"The deed

signed by Heritage Park Partners, grantor, to Heritage
Park Plaza, Inc., as grantees, filed December 9, 1980, in
Book 336, Page 678, was signed by all of the partners of
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Heritage Park Partners"

(See R. at p. 271 paragraph 3)

(emphasis added).
2.

Kaizerman/s Affidavit further states, "The deed

signed by Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., grantor, to Villatek
Inc., grantee filed December 9, 1980, in Book 336, Page
680, was signed by James C. Kaiserman, President and
attested to by Ronald Stout, Secretary."

(See R. at p.

171 paragraph 5) (emphasis added).
3.

The Affidavit of Clark M. Hillam (See R. at pp.

265-269) confirms that of Kaiserman as follows, "6.

It

is my further recollection that the Buyers, Heritage Park
Partners and the owners of Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.,
were all the same individuals and this fact is supported
by the deeds and other documents."

(See R. at p. 266

paragraph 6 ) .
4.

It is clear from an examination of the two deeds

referred to in the Kaiserman Affidavit (See R. at p. 271,
paragraphs 3 and 5) that they were both:
(a)

Dated October 24, 1980;

(b)

Recorded December 9, 1980;
- one in Book 339 - Pgs. 678-679
- the other in Book 3 39 - Pgs. 680-681
- one as Instrument No. 82457H
- the other as Instrument No. 82458H
- one recorded at 3:05 p.m.
- the other recorded at 3:10 p.m.
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It has been widely recognized that "where it appears that the
property of a business operated by a partnership or individual is
simply transferred to the corporation without consideration other
than corporate stock issued to the partners or individuals, or the
corporation is, in fact, merely a continuation of the old business
under a different name, it is liable for the debts of the preexisting

business;

at

least

a

presumption

corporation has assumed such debts."
§53) .

arises

that

the

(18 Am.Jur. 2d Corporations

"A corporation organized to take over the business of a

partnership or of an individual may assume the liabilities of the
partnership or the individual and thereupon become liable to the
partnership

creditors.

The assumption

may,

according

to

some

authorities, be either express, or implied from the circumstances,
and proved by any competent evidence which will establish it."

(18

Am.Jur. 2d Corporations §54).
The plaintiffs' argument

that

summary

judgment

should

be

granted because Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. cannot reserve a right of
way to Chadaz, who is a stranger on the deed is not justified.
Plaintiffs rely on the case of "In the Matter of the Estate of
Thomson v. Wade" (See R. at pp. 246-249) hereinafter referred to as
Wade.

The facts and rationale of the Wade case show that it simply

does not apply.
In Wade the court carefully pointed out that no easement was
reserved by the grantor when the land benefitted by the easement
was

conveyed.

The

grantor

had

failed

to

reserve

an

express

easement until the time when the land burdened by the easement was
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conveyed, at a time when the grantor no longer owned the land
benefitted by the easement. Consequently, the court noted "[i]t is
axiomatic

that

[the

grantor]

could

benefitting land which he did not own."

not

create

an

easement

(Wade at 310) (citations

omitted).
In the case before the court, defendant, Chadaz, has always
owned and still owns the land benefitted by the easement. Although
the defendant, Chadaz, did

convey the land burdened

by the

easement, she never did convey the land benefitted by the easement
due to the default of the buyers, and this land has never been
conveyed.

After the buyers had received the land burdened by the

easement, and in an express effort to salvage their attempt to
purchase the land benefitted by the easement, the buyers agreed to
expressly reserve the easement in the event they conveyed the land
now burdened by the easement to another party. Subsequently and in
accordance with this agreement, the easement was reserved even
though the potential buyers were never able to complete their
purchase of the land benefitted by the easement, which therefore,
remained the property of the defendant, Chadaz.
Clearly, from the facts of our case, it was the intent of the
partnership and the corporation, as well as Chadaz, that the
corporation take over the obligation of the partnership to reserve
a 66 foot right of way as provided in the Supplemental Agreement.
(See R. at p. 107 paragraph 4 and Addendum B) . Defendant, Chadaz,
therefore, created by means of the Supplemental Agreement the
express easement benefitting land which she owned.
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There was no

attempt to reserve an easement in favor of a third party and the
rationale of the Wade case simply does not apply.

Based upon the

foregoing it is defendant, Chadaz's, position that the stranger to
the deed

concept

(or the court's

suggestion

of third party

beneficiary) does not apply to our case.
Furthermore, even if the "stranger to the deed" concept were
to apply in this case, the law in Utah would not follow Wade but
would

follow

Willard

v.

First

Church

of

Christ. Scientist,

Pacifica. 498 P.2d 987 (Calif. 1972), (See R. at pp. 257-259; See
also copy of case R. at pp. 273-278), hereinafter referred to as
Willard.

That case provides that effect should be given to the

grantor's intent in creating an easement. It specifically states,
"In general, therefore, grants are to be interpreted in the same
way

as

other

standards."

contracts

and

not

according

to

(See R. at p. 275 right hand column).

rigid

feudal

Further quotes

from that case are as follows:
"The common law rule conflicts with the modern
approach to construing deeds because it can frustrate the
grantor's intent. Moreover, it produces an inequitable
result because the original grantee has presumably paid
a reduced price for title to the encumbered property."
"The highest courts of two states have already
eliminated the rule altogether, rather than repealing it
piecemeal by evasion. . . Since the rule may frustrate
the grantor's intention in some cases even though riddled
with exceptions, we follow the lead of Kentucky and
Oregon and abandon it entirely."
Willard at 275, 277 (emphasis added).
The case of Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P. 2d 377 (Alaska 1987)
approved "the general rule that deeds must be read to ascertain the
intent of the grantor."

The court then went on to approve the
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rational of the Willard case, infra.# and to specifically reject
the Wade case relied upon by the plaintiffs.

(See R. at pp. 279-

282) ,
B.

An Express And Recorded Easement Cannot Be Abandoned By
Nonuse

Plaintiffs argue that any easement in favor of Chadaz was
abandoned by her when she failed to build a roadway or use the
easement for "over sixteen(16) years" (See R. at 61). Although an
easement can be abandoned by nonuse, an easement gained by
conveyance "may not be lost by non-use alone" but "an actual intent
to abandon [must] be evident."

Western Gateway Storage Co. v.

Treseder. 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977).

Furthermore, any intent

to abandon must be shown by clear and convincing actions.
182.

Id. at

This principle has been widely recognized by many courts.

(25 Am.Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §114).
In this case, Chadaz's easement is an express easement which
was gained by conveyance from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. It cannot
be abandoned by non-use alone, and plaintiffs did not and cannot
point to any undisputed "clear and convincing" actions by Chadaz
evidencing any intent to abandon the easement. Summary judgment on
this basis was, therefore, improper.
C

The Recording Of An Express Reservation Of Easement
Imparted Notice To Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs claim that they own the property free of Chadaz7s
easement since they purchased it without knowledge

(actual or

constructive) of the existence of an easement (see R. at p. 58).
This argument completely ignores the undisputed fact that the
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easement was properly recorded in the Box Elder County Recorder's
Office.
§57-3-2 of the Utah Code provides, in relevant part:
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in
the manner prescribed by this title . . . shall, from the
time of filing with the appropriate county recorder,
impart notice to all persons of their contents.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§57-3-2

(1953

as

amended)

(emphasis

added).

Consequently, "One who deals with real property is charged with
notice of what is shown by the records of the county recorder of
the county in which the real property is situated."
Jensen. 78 Ut. 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931).

Crompton v.

"Whatever is notice enough

to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for
inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have
led.

When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a

fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it."

O'Reilly v. McLean, 84

Ut. 551, 37 P.2d 770 (Utah 1934); Lawlev v. Hickenlooper. 61 Ut.
298, 212 P. 526 (Utah 1922); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. at page
141, 25 L. Ed. 807.
The reservation of the right of way was dated October 24,
1980,

recorded

December

9,

1980, in Book

Instrument No. 82458H, at 3:10 p.m.
Addendum D ) .

339, Pages

680-681,

(See R. at pp. 25-26 and

The filing of the Special Warranty Deed subject to

the reservation of the right of way was sufficient to impart notice
to

all

persons,

recording.

including

plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs cannot be bona

from

the

date

fide purchasers

of

the

without

notice, and summary judgment on this legal theory was not proper.
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D.

The Doctrine Of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Extinguish
Chadaz's Express And Recorded Easement.

Plaintiffs claim that Chadaz is barred from claiming her
easement by the doctrine of equitable estoppel (See R. at P. 62) .
In making such a claim, plaintiffs again ignore the fact that
Chadaz's easement had been expressly conveyed and recorded.
With respect to the doctrine of estoppel in connection with
interests in real estate, "it is generally well established that a
person cannot assert an estoppel on the basis of the failure of an
owner of an interest in real estate to disclose such interest while
the aggrieved fcarty was carrying on some transaction relating to
such property, if the person seeking to establish the estoppel has
failed to avail himself of the constructive notice afforded by the
public records."

(28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §96) . In this

regard, "[w]hen the avenues of information are equally open to both
parties, there will be no bar. Nor is the party holding the title
bound to seek the other and inform him of his rights when he is in
no default. The owner of land, having his title duly recorded, has
given all the information to the purchaser which the law requires."
28 Am.Jur. 2d. Estoppel and Waiver §90 N. 12 (1966) (emphasis
added); Mills v. Graves, 38 111. 455; See also Porter v. Wheeler,
17 So. 221. Additionally, " . . . the mere fact that a person has
ascertained that a transaction relative to property in which he has
an interest is contemplated by other parties does not impose upon
him the duty of disclosing that interest. The nonexistence of any
duty under such circumstance is inferable for an additional reason
where the nature and extent of the interest held by the party
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sought to be estopped are ascertainable by an inspection of the
public records.

Indeed, because of the doctrine of constructive

notice, there is little duty outside the avoidance of affirmative
misleading acts, which is imposed upon the holder of an interest in
real property, which interest is disclosed by the public record."
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §90 (emphasis added).
There is no factual dispute that the reservation of the right
of way was made a matter of record December 9, 1980 (See R. at pp.
25-26 and Addendum D) .

The plaintiffs purchased the land in

question on or about July 23, 1993 (See R. at p. 7) , and therefore,
had constructive notice of the easement.

With such notice,

plaintiffs cannot use the doctrine of estoppel to avoid Chadaz's
easement.
E.

The
Conveyance
Of
The
Property
By
Without Reservation Of Chadaz's Easement,
Extinguish The Easement.

Villatek could not convey away more than it had.

Villatek
Did Not

It received

the property by Special Warranty Deed (See R. at pp. 25-26 and
Addendum D).

It was "Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66

Feet Of Said Property, For The Purpose Of A Road."

Villatek

conveyed the property away by Warranty Deed (See R. at p. 169-170).
There was no mention of the Right-of-Way in this conveyance.
Villatek's failure to mention the right of way clearly cannot and
should not destroy the right of way.
It is noted here that "First American Title Ins. Co. (on Title
Policy)" was named as a party defendant.

Attention is called to

the transcript of videotaped hearing pg. 31 lines 1-17:
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"The Court:

Before you leave that, I assume he

purchased this land with title coverage?"
"Mr. Grant:

Yes."

"The Court:

Why is the title insurance carrier not a

party?"
"Mr. Grant:

They are."

"Mr. Hadfield:

They have paid.

Your Honor."

"The Court: I assumed that might be the case. It raises
a question of equity, then, but go ahead."
"Mr. Hadfield: The question is why did they pay, also?"
"The Court:

I don't know whether that should

control the court."
"Mr. Hadfield:
"The Court:

No. it does not.

But the fact that they paid may affect the

issue relative to equity.

But go ahead."

It is obvious the title insurance company did not believe that
Villatek's failure to mention the Right-of-Way in its conveyance
did, in fact, do away with the right of way.
The fact that the title company failed to mention the "rightof-way" in its title policy does not help the plaintiffs.

The

right of way was a matter of record and the fact that it was not
mentioned in the title policy was not the fault of the defendant,
Chadaz.
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P.

The Easement Reserved By Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. Was In
Consideration Of The extension Of The Sales Agreement
Between Chadaz And Heritage Park Partners, And The
Subsequent Default On The Supplemental Agreement Does Not
Nullify The Easement

The parties negotiated a Supplemental Agreement dated November
25, 1980, which Supplemental Agreement contained the following
provision in paragraph 4:
"The buyer agrees that the property fronting on Main
Street, which has been released by the seller to the
buyer, has been sold by the buyer to a third party that
there will be a reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway
from Main street to the seller's remaining property
it

•

• •

(See R. at p. 107 and Addendum B) . This provision of the agreement
was fulfilled by the buyer (Heritage Park Plaza,Inc. formerly
Heritage ParJc Partners) . On December 9, 1980 the Special Warranty
Deed (See R. at pp. 25-26 and Addendum D) was recorded, which deed
described a parcel of ground containing 1.58 acres and underneath
the description provided as follows:

"Subject To A Right-Of-Way

Over The East 66 Feet Of Said Property For The Purpose Of A
Proposed Road."
Clearly the most important purpose of the right of way for a
road was to maintain an access to Main Street for the balance of
the property lying to the south of said right of way.

The fact

that the then current developer did not construct a road did not
diminish the importance of the right of way to the owners of the
property to the south or to any future prospective developer.

It

is still as important and necessary today as it was when it was
created.

The buyers (Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. formerly Heritage

Park Partners) gave up an easement in consideration of Chadaz
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allowing

an

extension

or

alternative

to

the

default.

The

subsequent default on the Supplemental Agreement cannot and does
not affect this bargained for exchange.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AMENDED
OR MADE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS IN GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The trial court

in its first Memorandum

Decision dated

September 19, 1997 held:
"Without reciting all of the issues and the basis
for decision, the court acknowledges that perhaps holding
the Wade case (In the Matter of the Estate of; Thompson
v. Wade, 509 N.E. 2nd 309 (New York 1987) is not entirely
justified, but neither is the Defendant's'
reliance
helpful.
*Stranger to the deed7 principles are not
particularly beneficial to either party."
"For the reasons stated in the Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment, the same is granted. The motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant is denied.
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare a formal
Order in conformance herewith.
(See R. at pp. 295-296 (emphasis added and Addendum E ) .
Unfortunately, plaintiffs had raised at least eleven different
points in their Motion for Summary Judgment

(See R. at pp. 302-

303) .
When

the

court

ruled,

"for the

reasons

stated

in the

plaintiffs' motion . . . the same is granted", Chadaz was left in
a

complete dilemma

as to the basis of the court's ruling.

Consequently, the defendant filed her Verified Motion For Amendment
To Memorandum Decision, together with Memorandum of Points and
Authorities. (See R. at pp. 298-307).
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The trial court's second Memorandum Decision dated October 21,
1997 (see R. at pp. 367-331 and Addendum F ) , while elaborating on
some points, still concluded, "as stated in the Court's original
Order in this case and as found

in the original Memorandum

Decision, the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the Plaintiffs
is granted and this Memorandum Decision will serve only as a
supplement thereto.
entered."

No further Order need be submitted nor

(See R. at pp. 327-330, the last paragraph and Addendum

F) . The defendant, Chadaz, has thus been left to attempt to
respond to "For the reasons stated in the Plaintiff's motion . . .
the same is granted."

This has resulted

in a very arduous

undertaking.
As set forth in Rule 52(a), the trial court is required to
issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its decision on
all motions granted under Rule 56 when the motion is based on more
than one ground.

According to the Utah Supreme Court, this

requires more than a blanket reference to the plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d
949 (Utah 1992) Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins., 839
P.2d 798 (Utah 1992). (See R. at pp. 322).
In the Retherford case the Utah Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Zimmerman, held:
"Such a blanket statement provides us with no
guidance as to the trial court's reasoning. It therefore
does not comply with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure which requires trial judges to issue
brief written statements of their grounds for granting
summary judgment when multiple grounds are presented.
See Utah R.Civ.P.52(a). Although failure to issue a
statement of grounds is not reversible error absent
35

unusual circumstances, we take this opportunity to remind
trial judges that the presumption of correctness
ordinarily afforded trial court rulings "has little
operative effect when members of this court cannot divine
the trial courts reasoning because of the cryptic nature
of its ruling."
(Retherford at 958(fn.4) (citations omitted).
It is defendant's position that in the words of the court
". . . the presumption of correctness ordinarily afforded trial
court rulings "has little operative effect when members of this
court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because the cryptic
nature of its ruling".
Defendant's understanding of the law is that failure to object
or to file a Motion For Amendment To Memorandum Decision under Rule
52(b) would have precluded the Court of Appeals from considering
the error on appeal.

Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns,

791 P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990).
CONCLUSION
This court should remand this case to the District Court for
a trial on its merits.

The defendant, Chadaz, is entitled to

present her case to a jury based upon all the evidence that may be
properly admitted.

It is improper for her case to be decided

summarily. The defendant should be awarded her costs and expenses
of this appeal.
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DATED this

1*1-

day of June, 1998.
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

Stephen R. Hadfield

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Reed W. Hadfield, certify that on the /*7& day of June,
1998, I served two copies of the attached "BRIEF OF APPELLANT RETA
CHADAZ", upon Marlin J. Grant, the counsel for the appellee in this
matter, and I served two copies of the attached "BRIEF OF APPELLANT
RETA CHADAZ" upon Gary Bywater, defendant, and two copies upon
Karleen C. Bywater, defendant, by mailing them to them by first
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
addresses:
Marlin Grant
88 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Gary Bywater
375 North 600 West
Brigham City, Utah

84302

Karleen C. Bywater
375 North 600 West
Brigham City, Utah

84302

MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

Refed W. Hadfie]
Attorneys for/tyefendant/Appellant
tr/1:chadaz.brf
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ADDENDUM
Agreement dated May 12, 1980
Supplemental Agreement dated November 25, 1980
Warranty Deed - Heritage Park Partners to Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc.
Special Warranty Deed - Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. to
Villatek Inc.
Memorandum Decision dated September 19, 1997
Memorandum Decision dated October 21, 1997
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ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM A
AGREEMENT
This agreement made and entered into by and between
FLOYD CHADAZ and RETA CHADAZ, his wife, of Tremonton, Utah,
hereinafter referred to as the seller, and HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS,
a Utah Partnership consisting of MAX D. FRAUGHTON, and
JAMES C. KAISERMAN of Kaysville, Utah, hereinafter referred
to as the buyer.
WITNESSETH:
THAT WHEREAS the seller is the owner of certain real
property situate in Box Elder County, Utah, and more particularly described as set forth in Schedule 1 attached hereto
and made a part hereof by reference, and the buyer desires to
purchase the same for the sum of $681,250.00 upon certain terms
and conditions as hereinafter set out,
NOW, THEREFORE for and in consideration of the mutual
promises, covenants and agreements to be performed and kept
by each with the other as hereinafter set out, the seller
hereby sells and the buyer hereby purchases the above described
property on the following terms and conditions to-wit:
1.

The purchase price will be $681,250.00 which shall

be paid as follows:

The sum of $60,000.00 on or before

March 31, 1980, receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged
by the seller, and the balance of $621,250.00 shall be paid
as follows:

The sum of $40,000.00 on or before September 1,

1980, together with interest on the said $40,000.00 at the
rate of 15% per annum, with said interest to commence April
1, 1980 and to continue until the $40,000.00 has been paid.
The sum of $100,000.00 on, but not before January 5, 1981.
The balance of $481,250.00, plus interst at the rate of
10% per anum, which interest shall commence January 5, 1981,
shall be amortized over a tenyaar period with an annual
payment of $78,321.00 to be paid on the 5th day of January, 1982,
with a like amount becoming due and payable on the 5th day of

January each succeeding year until January 5, 1991, at which time
the entire balance owing hereunder shall be due and payable.
The annual payment of $78,321.00 includes both interest and
principal.

It being specifically agreed that commencing with

the calendar year 1982 the buyer shall have the option to
pay up to but not more than $100,000.00 principal, plus
accrued interest, in any one calendar year.

It being

specifically provided, however, that an annual payment of
$78,321.00 must be made each year regardless of whether or not
any prepayments have been made.

It is further agreed that

the parties hereto may mutually agree to negotiate higher
annual payments, provided that such would be agreeable to
both parties and that a supplemental agreement in writing
to that effect be signed by each of the parties hereto.
2.

The possession of said premises shall be delivered

by the seller to the buyer on the 31st day of March, 1980.
3.

The buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments

levied against said property after April 1, 1980 as the same
become due and payable, and the seller agrees to pay all
taxes and assessments levied prior to April 1, 1980.
4.

The sale price of $681,250.00 as set forth herein

is based on the fact that seller herein shall obtain a survey
of said property which will show, and be verified, that the
seller can provide marketable title to buyer of a minimum of
45.75 acres of land, which survey shall be paid for and
provided by seller.

In the event such survey shows less than

45.75 acres to which seller can provide marketable title, then
the said purchase price shall be adjusted downward at the rate
of $15,000.00 per acre, or any portion of an acre, to which
seller cannot provide marketable title.

In the event such

survey shall show that seller can provide marketable title
to more than 45.75 acres, then the said purchase price of
$681,250.00 as set forth herein shall remain, and buyer
shall then be entitled to all acreage, upon final payment
hereunder, to which seller is now in possession.
-2-

In the

event any fence line or any boundary of said property shall
be within seller's possession, but not within seller's
record title, seller shall have a period of one year from
the date of this contract to attempt to clear the title
to said portion of said property, and upon clearing title
thereto within such period shall be entitled to payment
therefor provided such portion shall be necessary to comply
with the 45.75 acre minimum provision herein contained.

In

the event such title cannot be cleared within the one year
period specified, seller agrees to quit-claim any such
possessory rights as they may have to buyer without further
consideration.
A.

In the event such acreage shall be less than

the 45.75 acres set forth in the above paragraph, the payments
due September 1, 1980 and January 5, 1981 shall be and remain
as set forth, and all subsequent payments commencing January 5,
1982 shall be reduced accordingly so that the remaining balance,
plus interest, shall be amortized over the 10 payments commencing
January 5, 1982, and continuing until January 5, 1991, when all
amounts owing hereunder shall be due and payable.
5.

The seller agrees to pay a commission of 10% of the

amount of the purchase price as finally established to Southwick
Realty, Inc., and to Bill Brown Realty Inc., which commission
shall be payable 30% at the time of closing on March 31, 1980,
20% when the September 1, 1980 payment is made, and the balance
of 50% at the time of payment of the payment due January 5, 1981.
harmless
The seller agrees to save and hold buyer/from any claim for
such commissions.
6.

The payment due March 31, 1980 in the sum of

$60,000.00, the payment due September 1, 1980 in the sum of
$40,000.00, and the payment due January 5, 1981 in the sum
of $100,00.00 are each to be applied to the payment of
principal.

The annual payments commencing January 5, 1982

and becoming due and payable on the 5th day of January of
be
each year thereafter, are to/applied first to the payment
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of interest and second to the reduction of the principal.
Interest shall be charged from January 5, 1981 on

all

unpaid portions of the purchase price at the rate of 10%
per annum.

The buyer shall not have the right to make

payments in excess of those herein set out except as
specifically set forth in paragraph 1.
7.

It is understood and agreed that if the seller

accepts payment from the buyer on this contract less than
according to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing,
it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to
the forfeiture hereinafter stipulated

or as to any other

remedies of the seller.
8.

It is understood that there are no outstanding

obligations against said property at the present time.
9.

Seller represents that there are no unpaid special

improvement district taxes covering improvements to said
premises now in the process of being installed, or which
have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against
the property, except for assessments made by the TremontonGarland Drainage District which assessments the buyer herein
agrees to pay.
10.

The seller is given the option to secure, execute

and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed
the then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest
at the rate of not to exceed 10% per annum and payable in
regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate
annual installment payments required to be made by seller
on said loans shall not be greater than each installment
payment required to be made by the buyer under this contract.
When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amou
of any such loans and mortgages the seller agrees to convey
and the buyer agrees to accept title to the above described
property subject to said loans and mortgages.
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11.

The buyer agrees upon written request of the seller

to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender
and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon the
purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers
required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaining
said loan, the seller agreeing to pay the other one-half,
provided however, that the annual payments and interest rate
required shall not exceed the annual payments and interest
rate as outlined above.
12.

The buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments

of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life
of this agreement.

The seller hereby covenants and agrees

that there are no assessments against said premises at the
present time.

The seller agrees to pay and clear all Green-Belt

Amendment Roll Back Taxes as parcels are conveyed to the buyer
hereunder, or its assigns.

The seller further convenants and

agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations
against said property.

The seller and buyer both recognize

the existence of the fact that said property is now being
assessed under the Green-Belt Amendment, and is subject to
any claim of Box Elder County for deferred taxes as a result
of such assessment.

The parties hereto agree to cooperate,

each with the other, to attempt to retain so much of said
property under said assessment as may be possible, and as
may qualify, from year to year.

However, in the event of

any change of use of any portion of said property, either by
buyer, or by their successors or assigns, which would necessitate
the withdrawal of that portion from the Green-Belt Assessment,
and the payment of all deferred taxes thereon, seller agrees
to pay any and all amounts, upon receipt of request from buyer,
which may be necessary to clear such portion from the effect
of said assessment up to the date of this contract, and buyer
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shall assume all responsibility for payment of any such deferred
taxes which may result from the continuation of such Assessment
from and after the date of this contract.
13.

It is fully understood and agreed that all water

rights appurtenant to said tracts of real property conveyed
herein shall be and remain the property of the seller.
no water rights are being conveyed hereunder.

That

The seller

specifically agrees to pay all water assessments levied or
attached against said water rights

or the real property herein

to be conveyed.
14.

The buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after

March 31, 1980.
15.

In the event the buyer shall default in the payment

of any special or general taxes or assessments as herein provided,
the seller may, at his option, pay said taxes and assessments,
or either of them, and if seller elects so to do, then the
buyer agrees to repay the seller upon demand all such sums
so advanced and paid by him, together with interest thereon
from date of payment of said sums at the rate of 1% per month
until paid.
16.

Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to

be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon said
premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good
condition.
17.

Seller agrees to release parcels of property to

the buyer upon the following basis:
A.

Any reference hereinafter contained to the

"north portion of said property" shall be construed to be
that portion of said property lying north of the centerline
of Second South Street extended easterly to the east line
of said property, and any reference hereinafter contained
to the "south portion of said property" shall be construed
to be that portion of said property lying south of the center
line of Second South Street extended easterly to the east
line of said property.
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B.

Seller agrees, upon receipt of the down payment

to be made by buyer on or before March 31, 1980, to convey
to buyer, his successors or assigns, a tract of land which
shall encompass either three (3) acres in the north portion
of said property, or 4.5 acres in the south portion of said
property, or any proportionate amount in either the north
portion or the south portion of said property based upon
$20,000 per acre for the north portion and $13,333.33 for
the south portion, which election shall be made solely at the
discretion of the buyer, his successors or assigns.
C.

Seller agrees, upon receipt of the payment

due September 1, 1980, to convey to buyer, his successors
or assigns, 2.0 acres in the north portion of said property
or 3.0 acres in the south portion of said property, or any
proportionate amount in either the north portion or the south
portion of said property based upon $20,000 per acre for the north
portion and $13,333.33 for the south portion, which election shall
be made solely at the discretion of the buyer, his successors
or assigns.
D. Upon payment by buyer to seller of the $100,000.00
due January 5, 1981, seller further agrees to convey to buyer,
or his successors or assigns, an additional five (5) acres
in the north portion of said property, or an additional 7.5 acres
in the south portion of said property, or any proportionate amount
in either the north portion or the south portion of said property
based upon $20,000 per acre for the north portion and $13,333.33
for the south portion; location of which shall be solely at the
discretion of the buyer, his successors or assigns.
E.

Additional acreage will be conveyed by seller

to buyer upon request of the buyer on the basis of $25,000.00
per acre for the north portion of said property, and on the
basis of $15,000.00 per acre for the south portion of said
property.

Such acreage figures shall be calculated only

as the principal balance is reduced by such amounts, and any
application of any amount of any payment to the payment of
interest shall not be construed as entitling buyer, his
successors or assigns to a conveyance of any land for such
-7-

interest payment.

It is fully understood and agreed as

recited in paragraph 6 of this contract that buyer, his
successors or assigns, may not prepay any amounts except
as specifically set forth in the said paragraph 1.

It being

specifically understood that should the buyer make accelerated
payments as provided for in paragraph 1, buyer would be
entitled to conveyances for any such amounts prepaid as
they would be applied to the reduction of principal on the
basis of the price per acre set forth herein.

Any prepayment

shall be applied to the end of the contract, and the buyer
shall be required to make annual payments as herein set forth
each year until the entire contract has been paid in full.
F.

Conveyances to buyer by seller of any acreage

under the foregoing provisions shall be made with the provisos
that seller shall be relieved of such responsibility to do so in
the event of (1) any payment due hereunder being delinquent, and
not being brought current to the date of such conveyance, or (2)
seller shall have the right to retain such portions of said land
as may be reasonably necessary for ingress and egress to and from
the remaining land of seller, or (3) that seller shall have the
right to determine that such remaining land which is not conveyed
shall be and act as sufficient security for the balance of any
amounts remaining owing under the terms of this contract.
G.

In order to carry out the terms and conditions of

this agreement, the parties hereto mutually agree that title to
the property covered by this agreement shall be placed in trust
with Hillam Abstracting & Insurance Agency, Inc. which trust shall
be subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement, and the
Trustee shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this agreement.
18.

Buyer hereby gives the right to seller to farm any

portion of the land covered by this contract during the term
of this contract, without consideration therefore, subject to
the provisos that (a) in the event any tract of land which
seller is farming is sold by buyer herein, or (b) in the
event any portion of such land shall be needed, as solely
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determined by buyer, his successors or assigns, for development
purposes, buyer, nor his successors, shall assume no obligation
as to any damage which may be created to crops which may be
planted by seller, nor shall buyer, his successors or assigns,
have any liability to seller for any such damage or for any
crops which may be destroyed in the process of such development,
or in the preparation of any portion of said land for development purposes, or for any purpose which may be related to such
development.

It is the intent and purpose of these provisos

that seller shall conduct any such farming at his own risk,
and shall assume any and all risk of loss which may be inherent
or caused by the development of said land, or any portion thereof.
19.

In the event of failure to comply with the terms

hereof by the buyer, or upon failure of the buyer to make any
payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
thirty (30) days thereafter, the seller, at his option shall
have the following alternative remedies:
A.

Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the

buyer to remedy the default within five (5) days after written
notice, to be released from all obligations in law and in equity
to convey said property, and all payments which have been made
theretofore on this contract by the buyer, shall be forfeited to
the seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of the
contract, and the buyer agrees that the seller may at his option
re-enter and take possession of said premises without legal process
as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements
and additions made by the buyer thereon, and the said additions
and improvements shall remain with the land and become the property
of the seller, the buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of
the seller.

It being specifically provided that in the event the

seller exercises this option A that they will give written notice
ten days prior to the exercise of said option to anyone showing
a recorded interest in and to the property covered by this
agreement; or
B.

The seller may bring suit and recover judgment

for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees.

(The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall
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not prevent the seller, at his option, from resorting to one
of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent
default); or
C.

Seller shall have the right, at his option, and

upon written notice to the buyer to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to
treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title
to the buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to
foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of the State
of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied
to the payment of the balance owing, including costs and
attorneys fees; and the seller may have a judgment for any
deficiency which may remain.

In the case of foreclosure,

the seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall
be immediately entitled to the appointment of a receiver to
take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the
rents, issues and profits therefrom and apply the same to
the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same
pursuant to order of the court; and the seller, upon entry
of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of said premises during the period of redemption.
20.

It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.

21.

In the event there are any liens or encumbrances

against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other
than herein provided shall hereafter accrue against the
same by acts or neglect of the seller, then the buyer may,
at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of
any such payment or payments and thereafter the payments
herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the buyer,
be suspended until such time as such suspended payments shall
equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
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22.

The seller on receiving the payments herein reserved

to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees
to execute and deliver to the buyer or assigns, a good and
sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the above
described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except
as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued by or
through the acts or neglect of the buyer, and to furnish at
his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount of
the purchase price.
23.

The buyer and seller each agree that should they

default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein
that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses
including a reasonable attorneys fee, which may arise or
accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession
of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah
whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
24.

It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid

are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.

STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER )
On the IZ- day of May, 1980, personally appeared before
me Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz, his wife, signers of the
within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.

Public
Residing at

gham City, Utah

My Commission Expires
January 8, 1982

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF J^ji*2lJur

)'

On the )Z~ day of May, 1980, personally appeared before me
Max D. Fraughton, and James C.Kaiserman, individually and as
partners of Heritage Park Partners, a Utah Partnership, who
duly acknowledged to me that they executed the within instrument.

Not;
Residing at
My Commission Expires

Schedule 1
Beginning a t a p o i n t 54.4 f e e t South of t h e NJE. corner of the
N.W. i of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 !•'., S.L.B. & M. and running
East 30.0 f e e t ; the ce South 830.8 f e e t ; thence N 8 8 0 3 7 ' 3 5 " E
183.6 f e e t ; thence South 161.5 f e e t ; thence N 8S°37l35"

E 103.7

f e u t ; the- ce S 5°30' W 337.3 f e e t ; thence N 88 0 37 f 35" E 50.0 f e e t ;
thence S 5°30 f W 651.3 f e e t ; thence on a curve to the r i g h t of 500
foot r a d i u s * d i s t a n c e of 725.4 feet (Kote: Chord of s a i d curve
bc&rs S 50°05 p .' 624.8 f e e t ) ; thence S 8 8 0 3 7 f 3 5 " W 423.2 f e e t along
an e s t a b l i s h e d fence which i s p a r a l e l l t o the Half-Section

line

~nd 50 f e e t North therefrom; thence M 0 o 0 4 f l ' ' " £ 2563.4 f e e t ;
thence N 86°37 f 35"r 236. J r e e l ; tlier.ee ^ j u t h 191.3 f e e t ;
:»

eP°37'35

M

thence

E 410.0 f e e t ; thence *Jorth 191.0 f e e t to the point

be^innirir, c o n t o ^ i n r 47.22 =cres.
The s e l l e r r e s e r v e s t h e r i g h t t o r e m o v e t h e t w o s t e e l
g r a n a r i e s l o c a t e d upon t h e a b o v e d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y .

ADDENDUM B

ADDENDUM B
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
This agreement made and entered into by and between
FLOYD CHADAZ and RETA CHADAZ, his wife, of Tremonton, Utah,
hereinafter referred to as the seller, and HERITAGE PARK
PARTNERS, a Utah Partnership consisting of MAX D. FRAUGHTON
and JAMES C. KAISERMAN, partners and individually, and TRIPLE
"S" DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, RONALD W. STOUT,
GERALD E. STOUT and GARY V. SMITH, hereinafter referred to as buyer.
WITNESSETH:
THAT WHEREAS the seller entered into an agreement to sell
certain real property to Heritage Park Partners, a Utah partnership
consisting of Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman
Oldham, which agreement is dated the

and James E.

(&* day of May, 1980, and

WHEREAS Max D. Fraughton entered into an agreement whereby
he sold to Triple "S" Development Inc., a Utah corporation, his
entire interest in Heritage Park Partnership, which agreement
was dated June 30,1980, and
WHEREAS Ronald W. Stout, Gerald ff. Stout, and Gary V. Smith
entered into a personal guarantee of the agreement between
Fraughton and Triple "S" Development Inc., which guarantee
is dated June 30, 1980, and
WHEREAS Heritage Park Partners, a Utah partnership consisting
of Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman and James E. Oldham have
been unable to meet their requirements for payment pursuant to
their agreement dated the

|X

day of May, 1980, in that the

$40,000.00 which was to have been paid on or before September 1,
1980, together with interest on said amount at the rate of 15%
per annum, has not been paid, and
WHEREAS it appears necessary that if the property sold
by Chadaz's is to be developed as intended by Heritage Park,
Partners, that additional time is necessary in order for the
buyers to obtain the necessary financing,

NOW, THEREFORE for and in consideration of the mutual
promises, covenants and agreements to be performed and kept
by each with the other as hereinafter set out, it is hereby
agreed between the parties to this supplemental agreement
as follows:
1.

The seller hereby extends to the buyer the time

within which to make the $40,000.00 payment which was to have
been made on September 1, 1980, so that said payment shall now
become due and payable Ilarch 1, 1981, on which date the
$40,000.00 together with interest on said $40,000.00 (at the
rate of 15% per annum; said interest to commence April 1, 1980
and continue until the $40,000.00 has been paid) shall be due
and payable.
2.

The time within which to pay the $100,000.00 payment

which was to have been paid on January 5, 1981 is hereby
extended to August 1, 1981.

It being specifically understood

and agreed that interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall
be paid on said $100,000.00 with said interest to commence
January 5, 1981, and to continue until the $100,000.00 has
been paid in full.
3.

The buyer specifically agrees to take any and all

action that may be necessary or desirable in order to complete
the development and to obtain the financing necessary to comply
with the terms and conditions of their purchase agreement with
the seller.

The buyer specifically agrees to take the following

action:
(a)

File with the Farmers Home Administration

application for a loan guarantee on 2.2 million dollars,
which application has been filed prior to the execution of
this supplemental agreement.
(b)

To file for a loan of interim financing and

the sale of industrial revenue bonds with Commercial Security
Bank, and buyer represents to the seller that this action has
already been taken.

-2-

(c)

To make best effort to have preliminary plans and

a preliminary plat approved by the Planning Commission and City
Council of Tremonton prior to February 1, 1981.
(d)

To have completed and make available for

inspection preliminary drawings and costs estimates on the
development project prior to February 1, 1981.
(e)

To do everything possible to obtain tenative

approval from the Farmers Home Administration, and from
Commercial Security Bank prior to February 1, 1981.
(f)

Do everything possible to obtain final

approval from Farmers Home Administration and Commercial
Security Bank prior to April 1, 19 81.

This is to include

final drawings and a construction contract.
(g)

Take whatever action may be necessary in

order to begin construction prior to May 1, 1981.
4.

The buyer agrees that when the property fronting

on main street, which has been released by the seller to the
buyer, has been sold by the buyer to a third party that there
will

be a reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main Street

to the seller's remaining property.

It being specifically

provided that this roadway will be complete with curb, gutter,
sidewalks, sewer, and pavement, and shall be completed prior
to October 1, 1981.

The buyer shall also obtain or reserve an

easement or other reservation so that the seller (Floyd and Reta
Chadaz) can pipe their irrigation water in the existing ditch
along the west property line of the property that has been released
to the property that has not been released. But that buyer or
third party shall have to pay no part of the costs.
5.

The buyer agrees to develop and sell the• o o w n lots on

the south side of the property which have already been released
to the buyer.

It being specifically provided that the buyer

shall construct a 60-foot wide improved paved road with all utilities
furnished and stubbed to property at the approximate location as shown

-3-

on the attached conceptual plat.

It being specifially provided that

all expenses in connection with this road will be paid by the
buyer, and that said road will provide access to the remainder
of the seller's property.

This road shall be completed prior to

October 1, 1981.
6.

It is specifically understood and agreed that this

agreement is supplemental to that certain agreement made and
entered into on the

IX

day of May, 1980 between Floyd Chadaz

and Reta Chadaz, seller, and Heritage Park Partners, a Utah
partnership consisting of Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman,
and James E. Oldham, partners and individually, and that said
original agreement shall remain in full force and effect except
as herein specifically modified.
7.

Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman, James E. Oldham,

Ronald W. Stout, Gerald E. Stout and Gary V. Smith each agree that
they are personally and individually responsible and liable for the
true and faithful performance of this supplemental agreement
and also all of the terms and conditions of that certain
agreement made and entered into on the __J_7/^ay of May, 1980
between Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz and Heritage Park Partners.
8.

Heritage Park will pay legal fees to prepare this

agreement.
9.

Heritage Park Partners will provide a copy of road

improvement agreement.
10.

This supplemental agreement shall be binding upon

the heirs, personal representatives and assigns of each of the
parties hereto and should any party default in any of the
terms, covenants and conditions of this supplemental agreement
the defaulting party agrees to pay all costs and expenses of
enforcing this agreement including reasonable attorneys fees.
DATED this 2$ ^ day of November, 1980.
SELLER

BUYER
HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS

By_
Max D. Fraughton, partner

ames E. Oldham, partner

Max D. Fraughton, individually

James C. RalSermah, individually

*&SJuk~^

ames E. Oldham, individually

TRIPLE "S" DEVELOPMENT INC.
A Utah Corporation

Ci/ /XJ.'SM

By_
Ronald W. Stout, President

out, Individually

{ Gary V ^ Smith, individually
STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER )
On the Z?6' day of /?7/«?,'Ww
, 1980, personally appeared
before me Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz, his wife, signers of
the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.

Residing at Briiham City, Utah
My Commission Expires
January 8, 1982

STATE OF UTAH
v

COUNTY OF (>&*">

)
:ss
)

On the *^5~y day of ^^cr^*^^]
, 19 80, personally
appeared before me Max D. Fraughton, James C.Kaiserman, and
James E.Oldham, partners of Heritage Park Partners, signers of
the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing at: /y-

s
^^^

s^z^S

My Commission Expires

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF £>«*><*

)
:ss
)

On the zyZz day of y^-crt^-^^
, 1980, personally appeared
before me Max D. Fraughton, James C. Kaiserman, and James E. Oldham,
individually, signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

S>^ ^ ^
Notary Public
Residing at: ^ ^ _ J ? ^ ^ ^
My Commission Expires

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF £ X u ^ i

)
:ss
)

On the 2S"£ day of ^ Ox^^c*-^\
, 1980, personally
appeared before me Ronald W. Stout and
<£ « ^ /y
£ ^, /i^
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for Tiimself, that he,
the said Ronald W. Stout is the president, and he, the said
G* ^ is
>^/ 4C\ is the secretary of Triple "S" Development
Inc., ci Utah Corporation, and that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority
of a resolution of its board of directors and said Ronald W. Stout
and Co. ^ tX * S^ / /A
each duly acknowledged to me that said
corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is the
seal of said corporation.

Notary Public
Residing at: /<1^_^
My Commission Expires

^

^
^ ^

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

)
:ss
)

On the J2 j~tf day of H Y H ~ W ^
/ 1980, personally
appeared before me Ronald W. Stout, Gerald E. Stout, and
Gary V. Smith, individually, signers of the within instrument
who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

Residing at:
My Commission Expires

/ T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
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ADDENDUM C
•' L
AMRGARFT P. F V A M *

Recorded at Request oL

Box Elder County Recorder
•gcighqm Ciiy, Ululi 043:32

«t3:Q5P M. Fee Paid } ?«°°

DEC 9 1980

i. Book
2 2 2 _ Page 6 7 8
fl
Heritage. I^ri^Partn^ra
l l ^ ^ D e v o n ^ - ^ l d y s T i l l e , Ut;
m
.Address.
Mail tax notice to.

! -1

m

WARRANTY DEED * 339r«678
HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS,
of K a y s v i l l e
CONVEY, and WARRANT to

grantors ; \
, County of
Davis
, State of Utah, hereby
! |
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, I N C . , a U t a h C o r p o r a t i o n *

H

I

of
K a y s v i l l e , County o f D a v i s , S t a t e o f Utah
TEN AND N O / 1 0 0 — - — r--™
~
T
and o t h e r g o o d a n d v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
the following described tract of land in
Box E l d e r
State of Utah:

i !
i I

grantee
for the sum of
— DOLLARS,
County,

- SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO -

82457H

No.

"•'" DEC 9 1980

!:1

""« 3:05PM *••* 5 . 0 0

i^T,"', 313—..r^JZlfi
M«rg«r«t R. Ev«nt, fUcord«r
loa £U«r County. UUh a »?

~
*y
/&*>-

!i

WITNESS, the hands of said grantocs , this
October
, A . D. 19 8 0

day of

24th

HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS, by

II

r
^few^;
<4>&&&>?**~~'
JAMES C. KAIS^R^AN, Partner

Signed in the Presence of

I.'.!

>•«
;Vl

trier
E.

GERA

STOUT,partner
i \

STATE OF UTAH,
County of S a l t

ss.

Lake

TJA6Y \g/SMITH,

Partner

! i

On the
24 t h
day of
October
, A. D.. 1980
personally appeared before me J a m e s C. K a i s e r m a n , J a m e s Oldham, RQr\al4jW*.
S t o u t , G e r a l d W. S t o u t , and Gary V. S m i t h , P a r t n e r s o f • HQfftage:'.P'ark P a r t n e r the signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 'tfcey^f^ecutedthe' s h i p ,
same* for and in bahalf of said partnership.
..„./ •
O^, \'*,

il

My commission expire,

1-18-81

PA.Miwg

,„

S a l t Lake C i t y . - U t a h -

— - ^ - : »l_ANIC.#tO!-^-WAH«ANTT .DtCOr-u-C CCM K 1 C X O . f-r S1IS S0..2«O0 (AST .—. SALT L A * * CITY..

i

,

i

!

PART OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, TllN, R3W, SLB

BOOK 339?iGE 6 7 9
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF THE HIGHWAY RIGHTOF-WAY WHICH IS LOCATED S89°51'47"W 637.42 FEET ALONG THE
SECTION LINE AND S0°35'46"W 50.00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST
CORNER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, T U N , R3W,
SLB & M; POINT OF BEGINNING ALSO BEING LOCATED N89°51'47"E
3.00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF PLAT R, TREMONTON
CIJY SURVEY, THENCE S0°35'46"W 300.05 FEET, THENCE N89°
47'46"E 231.06 FEET, THENCE NORTH 299.75 FEET TO THE SOUTH
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE (POINT ALSO BEING THE NORTHWEST
CORNER OF THE HARRIS TRUCK AND EQUIPMENT, INC. PROPERTY),
THENCE S89°51'47"W 227.94 FEET ALONG SAID SOUTH HIGHWAY
RIGnT-OF-WAY LINE TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
CONTAINS 1.58 ACRES

SCHEDULE "A"

ADDENDUM D

ADDENDUM D
Tax Notices t o :
yillatek Inc. C/0 Golden Spike Bk.
rreaonton, UUh 84337

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
(CORPOKAT* PORK]

IP

339piGEggQ

t m

HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation
« a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
Kaysville
, of County of D a v i s
, State of Utah,
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through or under it to
VILLATEK INC., a Utah Corporation
of S a l t Lake C i t y ,

T

grantee
for the sum of

County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah

4^^^^^«lfiS^---a-v|J=ilIi;c6;lra^HEroS---~^:

State of Utah:
- SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO -

«*• 82458H
•

p

""

••

> a

DEC 9

1980

;

nm :

* ^iOPM *"* 5.50 ,.

M4r9«r«t R. £*«««, R«<©«**
|o< £U«f County. UUK

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorised under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at ,a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this
24 t h
day of
October
, AJX 1980
Jt&R£££&E_^^
By JAMES C. KAISERMANy
[CORPORATE SEAL]

J

STATE OF UTAH,

\ [
It

President.

V

County of S a l t Lake

!

\

On the
24 t h
day of
October
, A . D. 1980
personally appeared before meJames C. Xaiserman xsnd
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said James C. Kaiserman
is the
president, sxkhefthoeaid
xtethottttfscaiyc
of
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA. INC.
, and that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of
directors and said JAMES C. KAISERMAN
ntftdx
/.^
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal-affixed
is the seal of said corporation.
„—,
'* • ' - . . .
s

w
My

. . expires
.
commission

1-18-81
.7.. ...

wMy

(\) ^X 7
..
V
residence
is..* S a l t

'. Notary Public.
La5$e C i t y . . Utah

PART OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, TllN, R3W, SLB

BOOK
BEGINNING

AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH L I N E OF THE HICHWAY

OF-WAY WHICH I S

CORNER

LOCATED S 8 9 ° 5 1 ' 4 7 " W

L I N E AND S 0 ° 3 5 ' 4 6 H W

SECTION

339™ 6 8 1

50.00

637.42

FEET ALONG THE

FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST

OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION

SLB 6 M; POINT OF BEGINNING ALSO BEING

10,

LOCATED

3.00

FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF PLAT R ,

CITY

SURVEY,

47'46ME

THENCE S 0 ° 3 5 ' 4 6 M W

231.06

FEET,

HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY

300.05

FEET,

THENCE NORTH 2 9 9 . 7 5
LINE

RIGHT-OF-WAY
CONTAINS

1.58

227.94

TllN,

R3W,

N09°51'47UE
TREMONTON

THENCE

N89°

FEET TO THE SOUTH

(POINT ALSO BEING THE NORTHWEST

CORNER OF THE HARRIS TRUCK AND EQUIPMENT,
THENCE S 8 9 ° 5 1 ' 4 7 " W

RIGHT-

INC.

PROPERTY),

FEET ALONG SAID SOUTH HIGHWAY

L I N E TO THE POINT OF

BEGINNING.

ACRES

SUBJECT TO A RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER THE E*ST 6 6 FEET OF .SAID PROPERTY, FOR
THE PURPOSE OF A PROPOSED ROAD.
THE GRANTORS HEREIN RESERVE A RIGHT OF K\Y FOR TOE PURPOSE OF INSTALLING AND MAINTAINING A BILLBOARD, OVER A PORTION OF SAID PROPERTY, MORE
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT A POINT 66 FEET WEST OF THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE AFOREDESCRIBED PARCEL, AND RUNNING THENCE WEST S FEET; THENCE SOUTH 15 FEET;
THENCE EAST S FEET; THENCE NORTH I S FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT, AS NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF RUNNING A
TOWER LINE TO SAID BILLBOARD.

ABSTO. IN m f X f

••-

*J~

/C-//-S

^3c~-<&><-f
SQEDULE "A"
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ADDENDUM E

ADDENDUM E
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

*

DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE S.
POTTER dba DEAtt1 S SUPER LUBE,

*

Plaintiffs,
*

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

Case No. 960000272QT

vs.
RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims
66 foot Right-of-Way);
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C.
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed);

*

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO.,
(On Title Policy);

*
*

and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may
claim interest in said Right-of
Way.
Defendants.

*

*

Judge Gordon J. Low

*
*

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment, the first having been filed by Plaintiffs Potter and the
second by Defendant Chadaz.

Thought the Motions demonstrate that

there are some remaining issues of fact, the Court finds those
issues are not sufficient to barr the granting of the Motion for
Summary Judgment, on June 17, 1997, this matter was argued and the
issues

were

supplemental

identified.

Thereafter,

the

Court

received

argument by both parties.

Without reciting all the issues and the basis for decision,
the Court acknowledges that perhaps holding the Wade case (In the

MICROFILMED

SEP19W7

1°IS

Matter of the Estate of: Thompson v. Wade. 509 N.E. 2nd 309 (New
York

1987)

is

not

entirely

justified,

but

neither

is the

Defendant's reliance helpful. "Stranger to the deed" principles are
not particularly beneficial to either party.
For the other reasons stated in the Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the same is granted.
Judgment filed by Defendant is denied.

The Motion for Summary
Counsel for the Plaintiff

is directed to prepare a formal Order in conformance herewith.
DATED this

11

day of September, 1997.

2°\(o

POTTER v. CHADAZ, et al
#960000272
Page 3

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, Dean R. And Diane B. Potter v. Reta
Chadaz et al, Case No. 960000272, postage prepaid, this

/*

of September, 1997, to the following:
MARLIN J. GRANT, ESQ.
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525

REED W. HADFIELD, ESQ.
98 North Main
P.O. Box 876
Brigham City, UT 843 02

JEFF R. THORNE, ESQ.
98 North Main
P.O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302

& Sxil

Deputy Court Clerk

I:\wp\potter.metn

day

ADDENDUM F

ADDENDUM F
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT/ COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE S.
POTTER dba DEAN'S SUPER LUBE,

*
*

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs

Case No. 96O0OO272QT
*
*
*
*
*
*

RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims
66 foot Right-of-Way);
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C.
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed);
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO.,
(On Title Policy);

Judge Gordon J. Low

*
*

and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may
claim interest in said Right-of
Way.
Defendants.

*
*

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon a Motion brought by
Defendant Chadaz for the Court to amend its Memorandum Decision and
more specifically designate which grounds on the Rule 56 Motion
which constituted the basis for the Decision.
In its formal Order as prepared by Plaintiff's counsel, the
Court

stated

that

the

Summary

Judgment

was based

upon the

arguments, facts, and laws represented in Plaintiff's Memorandum
and supplemental responses.

By way of specificity, Defendant

Chadaz conveyed away all rights of the 1.5 acres. No reservation
was made

MICROFILMED
Date,3;£ji£RollNoA2_

therein

and none was preserved

on the

record

for

3^7

Defendant's benefit.

Defendant Chadaz does not have privity of

contract and subsequent negotiations do not create a valid interest
in favor of Chadaz. Chadaz did not receive any rights in the deed
from Heritage Park Plaza Inc. to Villatek and Heritage Park Plaza
Inc. could not reserve to Chadaz something it did not own.

It was

Chadaz's failure to reserve the right-of-way in the conveyance of
the property to Heritage Park partners that would extinguish any
right to then, or later, claim any easement.
Plaintiffs' purchase of the property occurred prior to the alleged
Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza Inc. to Defendant Chadaz.
The easement, if one ever existed, and if it consisted of any
rights in Defendant Chadaz, was obviously, by all facts presented,
unused for a period of approximately sixteen (16) years. No notice
by

any

reliable

factors

before

the

Court

demonstrate

that

Plaintiffs had notice of a transfer between Heritage Park Plaza
Inc. and Reta Chadaz when Plaintiffs purchased the property.

Any

right that Heritage Park Plaza and/or Villatek may have had by way
of easement, certainly could not be claimed to be in existence

as

demonstrated at the very least by the fact that Heritage Park Plaza
was a defunct corporation as early as 1983.
Plaintiffs have claimed estoppel and there are, as reflected
in their Memorandum and Affidavits, considerable reasons for the
Court to give deference to that legal theory.

Though there is some

dispute relative to the claimed right-of-way, nothing appears of
record and no evidence is presented that the right-of-way was used
by Defendant Chadaz or others.

Indeed, Defendant Chadaz has at

least one, if not several, access routes to her property which were
used

in lieu of any claimed right-of-way

property.

No

easement

by

necessity

can

across Plaintiffs1
be

claimed here.

Plaintiffs installed substantial improvements on the property, none
of which were ever objected to by Defendant Chadaz. The facts also
demonstrate that it is apparent that the claimed right-of-way has
not, nor could be, reasonably used by Defendant Chadaz as the
condition and terrain of the land, the ditch and the drop-off would
demonstrate.
Plaintiffs have in fact been shown as bonafide purchasers
without notice of the easement. Whether it existed ever or was
extinguished by non-use, the easement had to have been terminated
by the division of the property by Villatek, one of which went to
Bywaters and eventually to the Plaintiff. No reservation of any
deed was ever claimed by any of the parties and no number ever
conveyed or reserved.

The language relative to land deed or

easement was for consideration for purchase of property, which
purchase was never consummated, nor was the anticipated and
envisioned subdivision ever started as was envisioned with respect
to the claimed easement.

There was a time certain for the

completion of the claimed roadway which was October 1, 1981.

It

can certainly be concluded that failure to complete the roadway by
that time vitiated any agreement, claim or right with respect to
the

same.

Consideration entirely failed, conditions present

failed, and it can only be concluded that the intended use was
therefore frustrated and if any easement existed, the same became

nullified at that point.

The Defendant essentially clams a right

as a third party beneficiary to a failed contract.
enforceable

right

against

a non-party.

That is not an

In such cases, the

Defendant's relief is not for specific performance against a
stranger to the agreement, but for damages, if any, as against one
of the parties.
As stated in the Court!s original Order in this case and as
found in the original Memorandum Decision, the Motion for Summary
Judgment brought by the Plaintiffs is granted and this Memorandum
Decision will serve only as a supplement thereto. No further Order
need be submitted nor entered.
DATED this
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